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1Overview
Philippe De Vreyer and François Roubaud
Th e population of Sub-Saharan Africa stood at 854 million in 2010 (World Bank 
2012a). Annual population growth averaged 2.5 percent, with a relatively high 
sustained fertility rate, fostered by the fact that two-thirds of the population is 
under 25. Th e region has the highest proportion of poor people in the world, 
with 47.5 percent of its population living on less than $1.25 a day, as measured 
in terms of purchasing power parity in 2008. It is also the only region in which 
the number of poor is still rising. 
Th e eradication of extreme poverty and hunger is at the top of the list of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the member states of the 
United Nations (UN) in September 2000. Th is goal comprises three targets:
1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is 
less than $1 a day.
2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suff er from 
hunger. 
3. Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including 
women and young people.
Th e three targets are closely linked: monetary poverty is a key factor in mal-
nutrition and is determined in large part by access to employment. In 2007, 
an estimated 55 percent of working-age women and 79 percent of working-
age men in Sub-Saharan African were employed (UN 2008). Th ese rates are 
slightly higher than the average in developed countries (49 percent of women 
and 64 percent of men) and developing countries (49 percent of women and 
77 percent of men). Th ey thus suggest that lack of access to work is not the main 
cause of poverty in Africa. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has the world’s largest proportion of poor workers. In 
2007, before the international fi nancial crisis, 51 percent of employed people 
lived on less than $1 a day, measured in terms of purchasing power parity. Th e 
2007 average for developing countries was 20 percent, representing a sharp drop 
from 1997, when it stood at 31 percent. Progress in Sub-Saharan Africa was 
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much slower: in 1997, 56 percent of employed people lived on less than $1 a 
day. Th ese fi gures suggest that working conditions rather than access to work 
are behind sustained poverty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Scope and Purpose of the Book
Th is book contributes to knowledge on the functioning of urban labor 
markets in Sub-Saharan Africa by investigating a variety of questions. Which 
individuals lack access to employment or are employed beneath their capaci-
ties? Does education improve working conditions? What opportunities does the 
labor market off er to climb the social ladder? Is the lack of good-quality jobs 
for adults and the poverty it implies one of the reasons for the prevalence of 
child labor? Do women and ethnic minorities have the same access to the labor 
market as everyone else? How does the formal sector live alongside the informal 
sector? What role does migration play in the functioning of labor markets? Are 
there traits common to all urban labor markets in Africa, or is each country 
diff erent? 
Th is book attempts to answer these questions by studying 11 cities in 
10 countries (table O.1). Eight are members of the Communauté Financière 
Africaine (CFA) Franc Zone, and seven belong to the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU); all 10 are French speaking. Th ey are thus not 
representative of Sub-Saharan Africa.1 However, the sample of countries is very 
close to the continental average, whatever the economic and social indicator 
considered. 
Comparative studies are oft en based on disparate measurement instruments, 
which risk marring the validity of the fi ndings.2 Th is study diff ers from earlier 
studies in that it is based on a set of perfectly comparable surveys (the 1-2-3 
surveys, described below).With the notable exception of a report by the Inter-
national Institute for Labor Studies (Lachaud 1994), no other study presents 
a detailed overview of the labor market landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa. For 
10–15 years, no work of this kind was conducted.3 Th e study also covers a num-
ber of topics (migration, child labor, job satisfaction, discrimination, and work 
aft er retirement) in addition to the topics covered by Lachaud (unemployment, 
access to employment and mobility, segmentation, labor supply, and poverty). 
Th is book also draws on more and better-quality data. Th e Network for Labor 
Market Analysis in Africa (RAMTA) surveys contain only a few hundred obser-
vations per country, far fewer than the number of observations captured by 
the 1-2-3 surveys, which survey more than 120,000 people, including 80,000 
people of working age and 6,000 unemployed and 50,000 employed workers 
(table O.2). In addition, the sampling plans adopted by the RAMTA surveys 
are arguably “quasi-random,” with no updated sampling frame available. Th ese 
3Table O.1 Geographic, Demographic, and Socioeconomic Characteristics of the 10 Countries Sampled 
Country
Land area
(1,000 square 
kilometers)
Population
(1,000)
Urbanization 
(percent)
Per capita 
GDP 
(purchasing 
power parity 
dollars) 
GDP 
growth in 
2010 
(percent)
Net primary 
enrollment 
(percent)
Life 
expectancy 
(years)
Poverty
headcount 
(percent)a
Country 
Policy and 
Institutional 
Assessment 
(CPIA)
(1–6)b
Benin 111 8,850 42 1,590 3.0 94 56 16 3.5
Burkina Faso 274 16,468 20 1,250 9.2 58 55 45 3.5
Cameroon 473 19,600 58 2,270 3.2 92 51 10 2.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2,267 65,965 35 320 7.2 64 48 53 2.0
Côte d’Ivoire 318 19,738 50 1,810 3.0 61 55 24 2.0
Madagascar 582 20,714 30 960 1.6 79 66 81 2.5
Mali 1,220 15,370 33 1,030 4.5 62 51 50 3.5
Niger 1,267 15,512 17 720 8.8 57 54 44 3.0
Senegal 193 12,434 43 1,910 4.1 75 59 11 3.0
Togo 54 6,028 43 890 3.4 92 57 11 2.5
Average 676 20,068 37 1,275 5.0 73 55 35 3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa 491 17,780 37 1,188 5.1 75 54 47 2.7
Source: Based on data from World Bank 2011.
Note: Most data are for 2010. Last available year for net primary enrollment rate and poverty headcount are 2007–10 for most countries. Data on net primary enrollment are from 
2003 for Madagascar and 2005 for the Democratic Republic of Congo. Poverty headcount data are for 2003 for Benin, 2005 for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 2006 for 
Senegal and Togo.
a. The poverty headcount corresponds to the $1.25 purchasing power parity poverty line. 
b. The transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1 = low, 6 = high) was available for 37 out of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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shortcomings—attributable to the pilot nature of the operation—undermine its 
analytical potential. Although the 1-2-3 surveys used here focus solely on the 
main cities, their scope is broader than most other household surveys, which 
have much smaller sample sizes (generally a few thousand observations for the 
entire country).
Th is book makes use of only a small fraction of the data in the 1-2-3 
surveys. Although a number of surveys have broad coverage (national coverage 
in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all major urban centers in 
Madagascar), coverage here is restricted to the main cities, for several reasons. 
First, the editors believed that it was preferable to achieve homogeneity across 
countries by choosing the surveys’ highest common denominator (in terms of 
geographical coverage). Second, rural labor markets were excluded, for theo-
retical reasons. Th e questions and analytical instruments used to study peasant 
farmers in rural Africa are very diff erent from those used in urban settings. 
Th ird, the time dimension of existing surveys was not used, either in repeated 
Table O.2 Sample Sizes of African Cities Studied
Region/city
Number of 
households
Number of 
people 
Number of 
working-age 
population 
(10 years and 
above)
Number in 
unemployment
Number in 
employment
West Africa
Abidjan 2,494 11,352 8,682 769 4,884
Bamako 2,409 13,002 9,061 311 4,435
Cotonou 3,001 11,574 8,967 301 5,276
Dakar 2,479 19,065 14,871 907 6,313
Lomé 2,500 9,907 7,548 428 4,652
Niamey 2,500 14,577 10,141 651 4,231
Ouagadougou 2,458 13,756 10,295 928 4,914
Total 17,841 93,233 69,565 4295 34,705
Central Africa
Douala 1,399 5,726 4,326 330 2,295
Kinshasa 2,081 12,599 9,054 572 3,251
Yaoundé 1,198 5,159 3,783 304 1,766
Total 4,678 23,484 17,163 1206 7,312
Indian Ocean
Antananarivo 3,020 12,338 9,459 262 5,499
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the following 1-2-3 surveys: Cameroon 2005 (Développement, Institutions et 
Mondialisation [DIAL] and National Statistics Institute [NSI]); Democratic Republic of Congo 2005 (DIAL and NSI); 
Madagascar 2001 (DIAL and Institut National de la Statistique [INSTAT]); West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU) 2001/02 (Observatoire économique et statistique d’Afrique Subsaharienne 
[AFRISTAT], DIAL, and NSI). 
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cross–sections or panel data. Fourth, the study was deliberately restricted to 
Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 survey, which is most closely associated with the labor 
market. 
Two main factors explain the lack of a comparable study to date. Th e fi rst is 
the dearth of data. Th e second is the change in policy focus by the development 
community.
Th e Dearth of Meaningful Data 
Although employment is the main source of income for the poor, knowledge 
of the workings of African labor markets is spotty, giving rise to a number of 
preconceived—and oft en mistaken—ideas. Despite the universally recognized 
role of employment as a driver of macroeconomic growth and poverty reduc-
tion, information on African labor markets remains sketchy. Many research 
projects launched on the subject in the last three decades have run into this wall 
and been unable to produce signifi cant fi ndings. For example, of the 25 chap-
ters in Labor Markets and Economic Development (Kanbur and Svejnar 2009), 
which presents a good overview of the subject, only three concern Sub-Saharan 
Africa (excluding South Africa).4 Moreover, none of the three chapters is based 
on labor force surveys, the main source of data in this fi eld in the rest of the 
world. Too oft en, labor market studies cover a few hundred formal businesses 
(concentrated mainly in a few English-speaking African countries), which are 
themselves nonrepresentative. Th is type of study is unsatisfactory given that the 
(nonagricultural) informal sector represents 50–80 percent of urban employ-
ment, agricultural (and informal sector) employment is the most important type 
of employment in rural areas, and employment in the formal sector accounts for 
just a small proportion of total employment in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Th e Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) project and its 
avatars are symptomatic of this problem. Launched by the World Bank in a 
dozen Sub-Saharan African countries in the early 1990s, the project consists of 
matched (employer/employee) multiround surveys of a few hundred businesses 
in the formal manufacturing sector (Bigsten and Söderbom 2005). Th e project 
has produced some interesting and original results (Fafchamps and Söderbom 
2006; Van Biesebroeck 2007; Nordman and Wolff  2009, to cite but a few recent 
publications). Th e problem emerges when these fi ndings are used to shed light 
on the functioning of the labor market as a whole and to determine public poli-
cies (Mazumdar and Mazaheri 2002). 
Th e formal manufacturing sector represents just 1–2 percent of total national 
employment in most Sub-Saharan African countries. Even in the main cities, 
formal sector industrial employment (including employment in the public 
sector) accounts for less than 5 percent of total employment (table O.3). In 
contrast, the informal sector accounts for more than two-thirds of industrial 
jobs (up to 78 percent in West Africa). Contrary to popular belief, industry in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa is essentially an informal sector aff air. Even among wage 
earners, the informal sector accounts for more than a quarter of employment 
(40 percent in West Africa). Th e rate of wage employment is therefore not a good 
indicator for capturing formal sector jobs. Comprehensive coverage of the infor-
mal sector is vital for understanding urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Th e annual report on employment produced by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO 2010a, b) shows just how poor the statistics on employment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa are: for the 1991–2008 period, only 11 of 45 countries 
were able to estimate the national unemployment rate for at least three years, 
and 16 countries had no employment statistics at all for the period. No other 
developing region has such a severe lack of data. 
Labor force surveys are a key to understanding households’ economic activi-
ties in most countries, mainly in developed countries but also in the developing 
countries and emerging economies of Latin America, Asia, and North Africa. 
Sub-Saharan African countries have not adopted this tool (a notable excep-
tion is South Africa), for a variety of reasons (Roubaud 1994; Rakotomanana, 
Ramilison, and Roubaud 2003; Razafi ndrakoto and Roubaud 2003; Brilleau, 
Ouedraogo, and Roubaud 2005; Razafi ndrakoto, Roubaud, and Torelli 2009). 
Table O.3 Share of Formal Manufacturing Employment in Selected African Cities
(percent)
Region/city
Formal industrial 
employment in total 
employment
Informal sector 
employment in total 
industrial employment 
Wage informal sector 
employment in total 
wage employment
West Africa
Abidjan 6.1 68.7 42.7
Bamako 3.7 81.7 35.1
Cotonou 2.2 87.7 31.2
Dakar 6.2 77.9 43.9
Lomé 2.7 86.9 29.0
Niamey 3.6 86.3 29.0
Ouagadougou 4.8 74.5 32.1
WAEMU countries 4.9 77.6 39.5
Central Africa
Douala 11.0 50.9 24.2
Kinshasa 4.5 69.7 25.6
Yaoundé 7.6 59.6 25.2
WAEMU countries 6.9 61.0 25.1
Indian Ocean
Antananarivo 18.4 46.3 22.4
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table O.1 for details).
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One is the crowding-out eff ect triggered by household surveys of living condi-
tions (such as the Living Standards Measurement Study surveys promoted by 
the World Bank), which occurs when the fi nancial and human resources of 
national statistics institutes are thin on the ground.
In addition to the dearth of statistical tools, there are conceptual problems 
caused by the particularities of developing economies’ labor markets. Labor mar-
kets in poor countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, diff er from developed 
countries’ labor markets in terms of their small proportion of wage employment 
and large proportion of self-employment. Th ese markets are also characterized 
by apparent segmentation between a formal sector, comprising “modern” busi-
nesses known to the public authorities, and an informal sector, comprising “tra-
ditional” businesses operating outside of labor law, business law, taxation, and so 
forth. In addition, worker protection is weak: where unemployment insurance 
does exist (in a tiny minority of some of the richest countries in Africa), it is 
reserved for a small proportion of the population working in the formal sector. 
Few workers pay into a pension or are protected in the event of illness. Public 
employment agencies are underdeveloped, and the public is largely oblivious 
to them where they do exist. Job-seekers generally use their families and social 
networks to fi nd work.
Th e informal sector’s lack of respect for regulations has created some con-
fusion between the informal sector and inactivity, blurring the boundary 
between being in and out of the labor force and partially invalidating the notion 
of unemployment as defi ned by the ILO. Only 35 percent of employed work-
ers in the seven French-speaking countries of WAEMU were wage earners in 
the early 2000s, according to the 1-2-3 surveys (described below). Th e other 
65 percent were independent workers who had created their own jobs 
(as employers or self-account workers) or contributing family workers. More 
oft en than not, then, fi nding a job in Africa is a matter of drawing on an infor-
mal network to build the information and capital needed to start up a small 
service or trade without a shop. Th e strong tendency in Africa to employ family 
members means that a signifi cant proportion of employed workers are unpaid 
contributing family workers, who are hard to classify in the usual way. Another 
complicating factor is that work in rural areas is characterized by large seasonal 
fl uctuations, which means that the seven-day reference period generally used 
to defi ne work is not relevant.
Th e measurement of remuneration is also no easy matter. People who work 
in the informal sector operate in production units that do not keep accounts. 
Trying to capture their earnings by asking them how much they earned in the 
past 30 days will therefore probably not yield reliable information, because the 
notions of value added and intermediate inputs are hard to defi ne and measure 
in the case of informal production units. In addition, informal production units 
experience large business fl uctuations, making annual extrapolation of income 
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measured over a month risky. For all these reasons, understanding employment 
in Sub-Saharan Africa calls for the development of a special statistical tool that 
can home in on the particularities of labor markets on the subcontinent. 
Changes in Policy Focus by the Development Community
Th e lack of data is not the only factor explaining the small number of studies on 
African labor markets. A second factor is the loss of interest by the development 
community (researchers and decision makers), which turned to new issues at 
the beginning of the 2000s. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, much was written about structural adjustment. 
During this period, the catalyst behind the focus on labor issues was the World 
Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World, which examined 
whether labor markets were too rigid (World Bank 1995). Markets needed to 
be liberalized, the argument went, by making labor laws (hiring and fi ring pro-
cedures, minimum wages, social security, and so forth) more fl exible. Th e pre-
1994 devaluation franc zone countries were viewed as bogeymen (Rama 2000). 
Labor markets were liberalized, but the expected eff ects—upturns in growth 
in formal employment and wages—did not materialize (Kingdon, Sandefur, and 
Teal 2006). African labor markets, scholars concluded, were not so rigid aft er 
all, and labor regulations were not binding constraints (Teal 2000; AfDB and 
others 2012). At the time, a few unorthodox economists, in association with 
the major UN agencies, tried to sound the alarm about the devastating eff ects 
of structural adjustment and the need for social adjustment (Rodgers 1989; 
Standing and Tokman 1991), as a local version applied to labor markets of the 
“adjustment with a human face” advocated by Cornia, Jolly, and Stewart (1987).
At the end of the 1990s, when the structural adjustment rhetoric fi zzled 
out, the emphasis shift ed from the labor market to poverty, and both inter-
national and national development policies focused on poverty reduction 
(Cling, Razafi ndrakoto, and Roubaud 2003). Rare were the Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Papers (PRSPs)—the framework in which all national policies 
(general or specifi c) were supposed to be embedded—that mentioned specifi c 
employment policies. 
Only at the end of the 2000s were the virtues of effi  cient labor markets at 
reducing poverty rediscovered. National employment policies were put in place 
in some countries, generally without a suitable system to evaluate their impact. 
Th e international fi nancial crisis of 2008–09, with its disastrous eff ects on 
employment in the developed countries, has been a catalyst for putting labor 
markets back at the top of the development agenda. At the international level, 
the World Development Report 2013: Jobs (World Bank 2012b) and the thematic 
chapter of the African Economic Outlook 2012 on youth employment (AfDB and 
others 2012) are important initiatives. Th ere has not, however, been a massive 
resurgence of studies on employment in Africa, mainly because of the lack of data. 
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The 1-2-3 Surveys: A Tool for Understanding 
Labor Markets in Africa 
Th e contributors to this book use a unique series of identical—thus perfectly 
comparable—1-2-3 surveys conducted simultaneously in the main cities of 
seven West African countries and a few other countries (Cameroon, the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, and Madagascar) in the fi rst half of the 2000s (box 
O.1). Th ey present original, innovative fi ndings on labor markets using best-
practice statistical and econometric methods. 
Each chapter begins with a detailed presentation of the descriptive statistics 
used to elucidate a particular aspect of labor market functioning. Compari-
sons across locales are conducted. Th e descriptive sections are followed by in-
depth analyses of a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from segmentation to job 
satisfaction. 
Phase 1 is specially designed to measure the informal sector and employ-
ment. A series of questions identifi es people in the informal sector. Th e ques-
tions cover all the criteria contained in the international defi nition (the number 
of people employed in the business, the diff erent types of registration, and the 
type of accounts for self-employed workers). Th is information is collected for 
BOX O.1
What Is a 1-2-3 Survey? 
The 1-2-3 survey is based on the survey grafting principle. It nests three surveys target-
ing different statistical populations: individuals, production units, and households. The 
survey is based on the principle of a mixed (household/business) modular survey.
Phase 1—an augmented labor force survey—is a survey of household and individ-
ual employment, unemployment, and working conditions. It documents and analyzes 
labor market functioning and serves as a ﬁ lter for Phase 2, in which a representa-
tive sample of the heads of the informal production units identiﬁ ed in Phase 1 are 
interviewed. The Phase 2 survey seeks to measure the main economic and produc-
tive characteristics of the production units (production, value added, investment, and 
ﬁ nancing); the main business development problems encountered; and the kind of 
support informal sector entrepreneurs want from the public authorities. (Given the 
characteristics of Phase 2, the survey can also be said to be an employer/employee 
matched survey.) In Phase 3, a survey on income and expenditure is conducted on a 
subsample of households selected from Phase 1 to estimate the weight of the formal 
and informal sectors in household consumption by product and household type. Phase 
3 also estimates household standards of living and monetary poverty based on income 
or expenditure.
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both the main job and the second job, making the operational defi nition of the 
informal sector extremely fl exible, as it can vary depending on the aim of each 
study (national defi nition, international comparison, or research). Information 
can be produced on total employment in the informal sector and on the num-
ber of informal production units using the status in employment variable. Th e 
number of informal production units is vital for the selection of a representative 
sample of informal production units for Phase 2. 
Use of this survey means that for the fi rst time ever, informal sector employ-
ment and its characteristics can be described on a basis that is compatible 
with the ILO’s international recommendations (ILO 1993). Th roughout this 
book, the informal sector is defi ned as including all unincorporated enterprises 
(household businesses) that are not registered or do not keep formal accounts. 
Phase 1 provides all the information required to be disaggregated by the insti-
tutional sector.
Phase 1 is also a suitable instrument for measuring informal employment 
(corresponding to unprotected jobs), as defi ned by the ILO (2003). In addition 
to employment in the informal sector, the questionnaire also measures informal 
employment in the formal sector, using a set of questions on the type of job 
protection (type of employment contract, payslip, and benefi ts). Th e Phase 1 
questionnaire allows for a certain amount of fl exibility in terms of the informal-
ity criteria to be selected in keeping with international recommendations. 
Although the focus is on informal employment and the informal sector, 
Phase 1 also generates classic indicators such as statistics on employment, 
unemployment, and underemployment. Th ese indicators, especially open 
unemployment, do not properly measure tensions in African labor markets, 
however (see chapters 1 and 2). 
Phase 1 collects a wide range of information. It is a good instrument for in-
depth analysis of earnings and returns to human capital (education and expe-
rience); on-the-job training; gender and ethnic discrimination; labor market 
segmentation; migration; intergenerational mobility; job quality (hours worked, 
income, bonuses, social security, and so forth); job satisfaction; interaction and 
neighborhood eff ects; and other characteristics of the informal markets. 
Phase 1 has several limitations, however. First, to keep the length of the 
questionnaire reasonable, it studies few subjects in detail. For example, only a 
small set of information can usually be collected on the previous job, parents’ 
job, activities other than the main job and second job, and the income of inac-
tive people. In addition, the choice of a reference period for the questions on 
employment (generally the previous week, in keeping with international stan-
dards) is incompatible with the seasonal nature of certain activities (such as 
agricultural activities). Th is information is especially important when house-
holds combine informal and agricultural activities. 
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Second, dependent workers (employees, contributing family workers, and 
apprentices) may not know precisely what the legal status of the business they 
are working for is. Th is problem is serious if the estimation of manpower in the 
informal sector is based solely on Phase 1. However, the estimate derived from 
Phase 1 may be corroborated by Phase 2, which directly generates the number 
of informal workers in each establishment.5 
Th ird, measuring earnings in household surveys is a well-known problem: 
reluctance to declare one’s remuneration (especially at the top of the earnings 
distribution) and unavailability of book accounts or payslips (especially for 
informal workers) usually generate measurement errors and create downward 
biases. 
Given these shortcomings, special care was taken to capture income in Phase 
1. Labor earnings are associated with each remunerated job. For wage workers, 
the survey captures their current monthly wage as all nonwage components of 
remuneration (bonuses, public holidays, social benefi ts, and so forth, in cash 
or in kind). Unlike usual labor force surveys, Phase 1 captures the earnings of 
self-employed workers, which correspond to their disposable income (before 
taxation). National accountants used to call this income mixed income, because 
it includes returns to both capital and labor. For survey respondents who do not 
want to declare (or do not know) their precise earnings, a complementary ques-
tion asks for brackets of detailed minimum wage ranges. Measurement errors 
may remain despite these procedures, but robustness checks can be performed 
using Phase 2 data. 
Like all labor force surveys, Phase 1 authorizes the use of proxy respon-
dents. Many researchers believe that information obtained in this way is less 
accurate than information obtained by other means (Blair, Menon, and Bickart 
2004; Bardasi and others 2010). For this reason, Phase 1 guidelines recommend 
avoiding proxy respondent answers whenever possible, in order to limit poten-
tial bias. In West Africa, 82 percent of individual interviews are self-response; 
75 percent of the proxy respondents are either the household head or his or 
her spouse (Amegashie and others 2005). Th ese indicators are even higher in 
Madagascar, where 90 percent of individual interviews are self-response and 
82 percent are either the household head or his or her spouse (Rakotomanana, 
Ramilison, and Roubaud 2003). 
This book uses, but does not exhaust, the analytical potential of Phase 1 
of the 1-2-3 survey. It concentrates on the surveys conducted in the main 
cities of seven West African countries (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, 
Lomé, Niamey, and Ouagadougou) in 2001/02 (map 0.1). Some chapters 
also cover surveys of Antananarivo, Madagascar (2001 and 2004); Douala 
and Yaoundé, Cameroon (2005); and Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2005).
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A  Brief Survey of Labor Market Theories Applied 
to Development
Th is book is about the remuneration, job quality, and allocation of labor across 
sectors in low-income economies and across economies as a whole—issues that 
lie at the heart of the earliest models of economic development. Th e theoreti-
cal apparatus of development economics includes a number of key models and 
assumptions that are concerned with labor market functioning and the move-
ments of labor across sectors. Th is section briefl y reviews these models in order 
to set up the theoretical framework that is common to all of the chapters and to 
describe the methodology adopted.
Th e seminal work of Arthur Lewis (1954) places emphasis on the migration 
of labor from the agricultural to the industrial sector as a condition for out-
put growth. Th is model stands as a milestone in the theoretical development 
Map O.1 Sites of 1-2-3 Surveys Conducted in Africa 
Note: *Surveys used in this book. C = capital city; N = national; U = urban center.
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CONGO
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REPUBLIC
OF CONGO
MADAGASCAR
COMOROS
CAMEROON
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MOROCCO
BENIN
BURKINA FASO
IBRD 39778
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Morocco
1999–2000 Phases 1-2 (N)
2006–07 Phases 1-2 (N)
Niger
2002* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2012 Phase 1–2 (N)
Senegal
2002* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
Chad
2011 Phases 1-2 (N)
Comoros
2011 Phases 1-2
Côte d’Ivoire
2002* Phases 1-2 (C)
Gabon
2010 Phases 1-2 (N)
Congo
2009 Phases 1-2 (N)
Togo
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
Benin
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2003–04 Phases 1-2 (U)
2006–11 Phases 1-2-3 (N)
Cameroon
1993 Phases 1-2-3 (C)
1994 Phase 1 (C)
2005* Phases 1-2 (N)
2010 Phases 1-2 (N)
Mali
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2004, 2007, 2010 Phase 1 (N)
Burkina Faso
2001* Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2006–07 Phases 1-2-3 (N)
2012 Phases 1-2 (N)
Burundi
2006 Phases 1-2-3 (C)
2007 Phases 1-2 (U)
2008 Phases 1-3 (U)
Congo, Dem. Rep. of
2005* Phases 1-2-3 (N)
2012 Phases 1-2-3 (N)
Madagascar
1995–2010* Phases 1-2-3 (CU)
2012 Phases 1-2 (N)
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economics literature, because it is the fi rst to off er a representation of the func-
tioning of a “dual” economy. Dual economy models are a subclass of two-sector 
models of economic growth (Kanbur and McIntosh 1987). Th ey are intended 
to capture the main features of developing economies in order to enable better 
analysis of development paths and policies. What distinguishes dual economy 
models from others is not that they are two-sector models but that there exist 
asymmetries between sectors in their use of factors or in the way in which factor 
remuneration is established.
In the Lewis model, land is used in agriculture but not in industry, and capi-
tal is used in industry but not in agriculture. Land and capital are thus perfectly 
immobile; equilibrium is reached by the movement of workers between the two 
sectors. 
Th e second asymmetry lies in the assumption that a surplus of labor exists in 
agriculture that can be reallocated to industry without decreasing the amount 
of food produced in the economy, because the marginal productivity of labor 
in agriculture is zero. Wages in the agricultural sector are set according to 
 “conventional norms” rather than marginal products. 
Th e Lewis model assumes that the urban labor market always clears, mak-
ing involuntary unemployment impossible. Th e model predictions are thus 
at odds with what is observed in urban areas of low-income countries, which 
are characterized by high levels of visible and disguised unemployment and a 
large informal sector that includes small unregistered fi rms and self-employed 
workers. 
Another milestone of development economics, the Harris and Todaro (1970) 
migration model, explains these features by assuming that agricultural workers’ 
decision to migrate depends on the diff erence between the prevalent agricul-
tural wage and the expected urban wage, which is positively correlated with 
the wage level in the modern sector and negatively correlated with the unem-
ployment rate. Th e model predicts an equilibrium rate of unemployment and 
is compatible with the existence of a large informal sector with low income 
levels. Like Lewis’s model, the Harris and Todaro model is dual. Th e wage in the 
modern sector is assumed to be higher than the market-clearing level, because 
rigidities can result from labor market legislation (such as minimum wages) or 
from fi rm rational behavior (the effi  cient wage hypothesis [Stiglitz 1974, 1976; 
Akerlof 1982; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984] is among the possible explanations). 
Th e theory of labor market segmentation was born in the early 1970s to explain 
the challenge of persistent poverty in the affl  uent society of the 1960s (Cain 
1976). According to this theory, poverty could be best understood in terms of a 
dual labor market, in which “the poor are confi ned to the secondary labor mar-
ket. Eliminating poverty requires that they gain access to primary employment” 
(Piore 1970, p. 55). Unless segmentation is removed, policies that increase the 
human capital of the poor are not likely to produce results. 
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Th is theory pictures the labor market divided into primary and secondary 
“segments.” Jobs in the primary segment are supposed to be more desirable 
because they off er higher pay, more promotion possibilities, and better working 
conditions and are more stable than jobs in the secondary segment. In low-
income countries, the secondary segment is oft en identifi ed with the informal 
sector, which comprises small unregistered fi rms and self-employed workers, 
whereas the primary segment is composed of registered private fi rms and the 
public sector. Several explanations have been off ered as to why such segmenta-
tion persists. Workers in the secondary labor market could be discriminated 
against because of their race, gender, or social class. It could also be the case 
that workers confi ned to the secondary segment develop tastes and attitudes 
that exacerbate their disadvantaged position (for instance, women preferring to 
hold part-time jobs in order to dedicate more time to caring and family duties) 
(Piore 1970; Doeringer and Piore 1971). Segmentation could also result from 
imperfect capital markets if some occupations require high levels of invest-
ment that cannot be supported by people with low initial wealth (Banerjee and 
 Newman 1993). Capital market imperfections may also explain why the infor-
mal sector itself is sometimes dual, in the sense that some workers work in the 
lower tier and others work in the upper tier of the informal sector, into which 
entry is restricted by human capital and fi nancial capital requirements (Fields 
1990, 2010).
Th ese theories challenge the predictions of the human capital theory, which 
predicts a positive relationship between educational attainment and wages 
(Becker 1964). Th e presence of discrimination in the labor market goes against 
the prediction that better-educated workers should receive higher wages and 
suggests that gender, race, or ethnicity may play prominent roles. 
Th e job competition theory makes the assumption that the number of jobs 
in the primary segment is limited and that workers compete to obtain them. 
In this competition, employers use screening devices to hire workers based 
on their trainability and adaptability (Th urow 1972, 1975; Th urow and Lucas 
1972). Education may be linked to higher wages and better jobs—not because 
it provides workers with a higher level of human capital but because it helps 
employers screen people with the desirable characteristics: only people with the 
capacities desired by fi rms are able and willing to acquire the signal (in other 
words, to get educated) (Spence 1973). 
Th e theoretical foundations of development economics were at play in the 
choice of the topics treated in the 14 chapters of this book. Th e contributors 
take an agnostic view, recognizing that although education and working expe-
rience remain the principal determinants of individual earnings, disguised 
unemployment, segmentation, duality, and discrimination are probably key 
dimensions of labor markets in urban Africa (indeed, several chapters study 
these phenomena). 
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Another important assumption implicit throughout the book is the ratio-
nality of individuals—the notion that people choose where to live and where 
to work by maximizing their utility under constraint. Whenever necessary, the 
contributors account for the self-selection of individuals into activities, sectors, 
and markets in their econometric estimations. 
Th e development literature is divided over the appropriateness of the “homo 
economicus” paradigm for studying low-income economies. Th e “formal” 
school assumes that the laws of economics apply whatever the society’s level of 
development (Cook 1966; Schneider 1974; see Isaac 2005 for a survey). People 
everywhere face the same problem of maximizing gains and minimizing losses 
given their (scarce) resources. Th e “substantivist” school of Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 
1957; Dalton 1967) rejects this assumption for peasant societies and societies 
with low levels of development, in which, they claim, people do not engage in 
maximizing behavior. Given that this book assumes that people are driven by 
some sense of maximizing behavior, it might seem that it stands on the formal-
ist side of the controversy. In fact, it follows Becker (1962), who argues that the 
most important dimension in explaining individual behavior lies not in the 
objective function but rather in the constraints under which decisions are made. 
In other words, it does not really matter whether individuals are rational in the 
sense that they engage in maximizing behavior. What is important is the fact 
that it is not possible to use more resources than those that are available at the 
time decisions are made. 
Th is view is not far from that of Levi-Strauss (2001), who closes the debate 
between substantivists and formalists by noting that between the two schools 
of thought 
the diff erence is relative, not absolute, in that one can compare the explana-
tory power of economic theory to a piston that moves in a cylinder that is 
sometimes a bit larger and sometime much larger than it. Even in the best 
case, the piston never perfectly adheres to the surface and lets a minimum 
quantity of energy escape or, in the case of economic theory, information that 
is lacking in order to allow a complete understanding of the society in purely 
economic terms (authors’ translation). 
Th is book testifi es to the soundness of Levi-Strauss’s view.
Overview of Main Findings
 Th is book is divided into fi ve parts. Part I provides a comparative analysis of 
urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Composed of a single chapter, it 
provides a descriptive overview and presents the main stylized facts investigated 
throughout the book. Part II focuses on job quality and labor market conditions 
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(unemployment and underemployment, vulnerability, job satisfaction). Part III 
explores the many dimensions of labor market inequalities. Th is multifaceted 
issue is examined through various lenses, including returns to education, labor 
market segmentation, intergenerational mobility, time-related inequality, and 
gender and ethnic discrimination in earnings. Part IV addresses some key cop-
ing mechanisms and private responses, with a focus on migration, child labor, 
and activity in old age. It examines migration from diff erent angles. In particu-
lar, it considers for the fi rst time the determinants of subregional migration 
(within West Africa) and the performance of returning migrants. Part V identi-
fi es the way forward. It stresses three promising avenues for the labor market 
research agenda: employment and the informal sector in relation to poverty, 
the microeconomic and macroeconomic dynamics of the labor market, and 
the impact of public policies. It also advocates for urgently addressing the data 
challenge.
Given the richness and complexity of the chapters, synthesizing the main 
results is diffi  cult. Two lenses are adopted: a macro perspective, in which coun-
try specifi cities are explored, and a micro perspective, in which the heterogene-
ity at the level of the individual is taken into account. 
Th e Macro Level: Labor Market Homogeneity and 
Heterogeneity in Africa 
Determining whether labor markets are homogeneous or heterogeneous has 
important policy implications. If the diff erences between countries are mar-
ginal, policies for improving the way they function will be similar. If the diff er-
ences are signifi cant, policies will have to be tailored to local situations.
Homogeneity of urban labor markets in Africa. Urban labor markets in Africa 
are surprisingly homogeneous (the consistency of the results is a good indi-
rect indicator of the quality of the surveys). Despite increases in school enroll-
ment rates, Africa’s working-age population is low skilled. Th e average years of 
schooling (seven) in the countries studied is more or less the same as the level 
in France in 1913; in West Africa, the average is comparable to the level in the 
United Kingdom in 1870 (Maddison 1995). 
Unemployment rates (about 10 percent) are similar to the rates observed in 
developed countries (albeit at the high end of the scale). Unlike in developed 
countries, however, unemployment rates tend to rise with the level of educa-
tion (falling off  at university level only in certain countries), a feature shared by 
North African countries (AfDB and others 2012). Th is fi nding would appear to 
bear out the “luxury unemployment” hypothesis that in the absence of unem-
ployment benefi ts, the very poor cannot aff ord to be unemployed. Underem-
ployment, rather than unemployment, is the main adjustment variable between 
labor supply and demand. 
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One of the main features of urban labor markets in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the importance of the informal sector (which employs about 70 percent of all 
workers) and its corollary, the low rate of wage employment (the correlation 
coeffi  cient between the two indicators is –0.93, signifi cant at the 1 percent level). 
Excluding agriculture, nowhere else in the world are wage employment rates as 
low as in Africa, no matter how far back the historical series go (Marchand and 
Th élot 1997). In 1851, for example, the wage employment rate was 60 percent 
in France—well above the less than 40 percent in the African countries covered 
in this book. Moreover, this gap is hugely underestimated, as the surveys cover 
only the main cities, where wage employment is highest. Wage employment 
rates in France (and in developed countries in general) quickly shot up to more 
than 80 percent. A similar trend has not occurred in Africa, where the particu-
larly rapid urban transition has not been accompanied by a shift  to nonagri-
cultural wage employment and workers who enter the informal sector tend to 
get stuck there (although there is some nonnegligible movement between the 
formal and informal sectors). Labor market theories and instruments developed 
by labor economists for the industrial world are thus totally unsuited to analyz-
ing Africa, even its urban areas. 
Heterogeneity of urban labor markets in Africa. Urban labor markets in Sub-
Saharan Africa also display a great deal of heterogeneity (fi gure O.1). Diff er-
ences are at least as great as in the countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). Labor force participation rates are 
43  percent in Kinshasa and 68 percent in Lomé. Observed unemployment 
rates are 4.4 percent in Antananarivo and 15.4 percent in Ouagadougou. Time-
related underemployment rates are 9.9 percent in Yaoundé and 19.6 percent 
in Kinshasa, and invisible underemployment rates range from 37.1 percent, 
in Douala to 66.6 percent in Ouagadougou.6 Th e informal sector accounts for 
53 percent of jobs in Antananarivo and 81 percent in Lomé. Wage employment 
rates are 24 percent in Lomé and Cotonou and 53 percent in Antananarivo. 
Even the generally low rate of public employment for all countries (compared 
with developed countries)—a mark of chronic underadministration—ranges 
from less than 7 percent in Douala and Abidjan to 17 percent in Kinshasa and 
Yaoundé, indicating wide diff erences even within the same country. Multiple 
jobholding rates range from 4 percent in Dakar to 14 percent in Douala and 
Yaoundé. Earnings levels range from €20 a month in Kinshasa and €30 in Lomé 
to €110 in Abidjan and Yaoundé. Th e formal/informal earnings gap also diff ers 
widely across cities, with a ratio in favor of the formal sector of 1.8 times in 
Antananarivo and Kinshasa and 4.2 in Abidjan and Ouagadougou. Gini coef-
fi cients range from 0.53 in Antananarivo to 0.62 in Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, 
and Kinshasa and 0.64 in Ouagadougou. Th e economic policy implications are 
clear: even in countries arguably as comparable as the ones examined here, a 
one-size-fi ts-all solution is not going to work. 
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Figure O.1 Key Urban Labor Market Indicators in Sub-Saharan African and OECD Countries
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It is diffi  cult to produce a straightforward typology of labor markets; no 
simple explanatory model seems to withstand examination of the empirical 
results. A detailed econometric analysis is inappropriate because of the small 
number of observation points (11, each corresponding to one city). Analysis 
of the correlation matrix for some key indicators does reveal the diversity and 
complexity of the confi gurations, however (see table O.3). Th e proposed typol-
ogy of Teal (2000), which includes three archetypes and is based on just three 
countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, and South Africa), is also much too simplistic. For 
example, the correlation between unemployment and employment rates in the 
informal sector is not signifi cantly diff erent from zero (–0.07, not statistically 
Sources: Panels a, c, e, g, i based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table O.1 for details); 
panels b, d, f, h, j, ILO 2012.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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Figure O.1 (continued)
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signifi cant), suggesting that there is no easy trade-off  between the two, as the 
mismatch between (formal) labor supply and demand is expressed by either 
unemployment or the expansion of the informal sector. 
A few interesting conclusions can be drawn from table O.4 (although the 
small number of observations calls for caution, and causal links cannot be estab-
lished). First, the participation rate is negatively correlated with the unemploy-
ment rate (–0.33, not statistically signifi cant) and the extended unemployment 
rate (–0.63, signifi cant at the 10 percent level). Th e quantity of labor is thus 
not constant, and a large labor supply is not associated with higher unemploy-
ment—far from it. Th e quantity of labor is also not associated with employment 
in the informal sector (the correlation between the two phenomena is not sig-
nifi cant). However, as public jobs are rationed, a high labor force participation 
rate is associated with a low public employment rate (–0.67, signifi cant at the 
5 percent level). With respect to unemployment, although the two measures 
used (the ILO defi nition and extended unemployment) display huge diff erences 
in levels (see chapter 1), they are very closely correlated (0.88, signifi cant at 
the 1 percent level). However, there are no links between the diff erent forms 
of underemployment (unemployment and time-related and invisible under-
employment). Th ese phenomena are therefore independent manifestations of 
the mismatch between supply and demand. A high unemployment rate is not 
associated with a low rate of informal sector employment or a high reservation 
wage among the unemployed (see chapter 1).
With respect to job structure, the share of informal sector employment is 
logically inversely proportional to the wage employment share (–0.93, signifi cant 
at the 1 percent level), even though the informal sector represents a large per-
centage of wage earners. Th e relations with the public employment share (–0.36) 
and the industrial employment share (–0.43) are negative but not statistically 
signifi cant. However, the multiple jobholding rate falls very signifi cantly with the 
presence of the informal sector (–0.81, signifi cant at the 1 percent level), high-
lighting the narrow room for maneuvering (especially in terms of time) freed 
up by this sector. Th e higher the share of employment in the informal sector, 
the lower the earnings (–0.25, not statistically signifi cant); the more widespread 
invisible underemployment (0.69, signifi cant at the 5 percent level); and the 
wider the gaps between formal and informal sector earnings (0.49, not statisti-
cally signifi cant) and male and female earnings (0.73, signifi cant at the 1 percent 
level). Th e relations between these features of the labor markets are refl ected by 
higher levels of inequality in earned income (the correlation with the Gini coef-
fi cient of 0.80 is signifi cant at the 1 percent level). Th e inverse relation is found 
for the wage employment rate, which is negatively related to the earnings gap by 
gender and institutional sector and to inequality but is positively related to the 
multiple jobholding rate. Finally, the higher the invisible underemployment rate, 
the higher the inequality (0.56, signifi cant at the 10 percent level).
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Table O.4 Correlation Matrix for Main Labor Market Indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa 
PR UR1 UR2 REG UTR IUR WER IER PER IndER MJR Earnings M/F E F/I E Q3/Q1 Gini0 Gini
Participation rate (PR) 1
Unemployment rate ILO (UR1) –0.33 1
Unemployment rate extended 
(UR2) –0.63* 0.88*** 1
Reservation earnings gap 
(REG)a 0.58* –0.21 –0.39 1
Time-related underemployment 
rate (UTR) –0.33 –0.33 –0.06 –0.32 1
Invisible underemployment 
rate (IUR) 0.19 –0.06 –0.11 0.36 –0.26 1
Wage employment rate (WER) –0.02 0.21 0.44 –0.13 –0.31 –0.64** 1
Informal sector employment 
rate (IER) 0.06 –0.07 –0.43 0.19 0.25 0.69** –0.93*** 1
Public employment rate (PER) –0.67** 0.44 0.63** –0.50 –0.12 –0.26 0.21 –0.36 1
Industrial employment rate 
(IndER) 0.09 –0.35 0.26 0.34 –0.03 0.04 0.44 –0.43 –0.19 1
Multiple jobholding rate (MJR) 0.17 –0.29 –0.17 –0.02 –0.15 –0.65** 0.64** –0.81*** 0.09 0.30 1
Nominal earnings 0.23 0.26 –0.08 0.54* –0.39 –0.29 0.46 –0.25 –0.23 0.06 0.16 1
Male/female earnings ratio 
(M/F E) 0.39 –0.40 –0.73** 0.54* –0.00 0.48 –0.72** 0.73*** –0.54* –0.29 –0.37 0.08 0.49 1
Formal/informal sector 
earnings ratio (F/I E) 0.51 0.35 –0.10 0.64** –0.52* 0.64** –0.32 0.49 –0.40 –0.15 –0.52 0.37 1
Quartile 3 (high)/Quartile 1 (low) –0.32 0.19 0.29 –0.04 0.27 0.27 –0.60* 0.50 0.27 –0.28 –0.52 –0.36 0.18 0.38 1
Gini0 (including earnings = 0) –0.12 0.38 0.04 0.02 –0.10 0.56* –0.77*** 0.80*** 0.05 –0.68** –0.73*** –0.17 0.57* 0.57* 0.69** 1
Gini (excluding earnings = 0) –0.26 0.45 0.25 –0.11 0.08 0.31 –0.63** 0.68** 0.12 –0.67** –0.73*** –0.12 0.41 0.45 0.78*** 0.92*** 1
Sources: Based on Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys of selected countries (see table O.1 for details).
a. The reservation earnings gap is the gap between the minimum earnings at which the unemployed would accept a job and the earnings of workers with equivalent characteristics (see the 
methodology described in chapter 1, table 1.10). 
* significant at the 10 percent level, ** significant at the 5 percent level, *** significant at the 1 percent level.
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Th e Micro Level: Heterogeneity across Individuals
Moussa and Fatou are 20-year-olds living in the capital of a French-speaking 
African country. Both graduated from upper-secondary school. What are their 
prospects? What benefi ts can they hope to gain from their qualifi cations? Were 
their parents right to invest in their education? Will it increase their chances 
of entering the world of work and fi nding a good job? Will they be able to 
fi nd fulfi lling jobs, or will they have to accept jobs for which they are over-
qualifi ed? Will they be unemployed, out of the labor force, wage workers, or 
self-employed? Will they work in the formal or informal sector? What will the 
outcome depend on? How late in life will they have to keep working to ensure 
they maintain a decent standard of living? 
Moussa, Fatou, and their families have surely asked themselves these ques-
tions and many others. Th ey are vitally important. Africa is the youngest conti-
nent in the world today, with more than 64 percent of the population under 25 
years old. In view of demographic growth, the number of young people arriving 
on the labor market is expected to grow steadily.
Fatou is an exception. Like Moussa, she graduated from upper-secondary 
school. She therefore has an above-average education compared with young 
people in her generation, 27 percent of whom, boys and girls included, did 
not attend school between the ages of 10 and 14 (chapters 1 and 12). Fatou 
is even more exceptional than the other young girls, 34 percent of whom 
(compared with 20 percent of boys) in her generation did not attend school 
between 10 and 14. 
In French-speaking Africa, there continues to be a wide gap between boys’ 
and girls’ levels of education, despite substantial narrowing in recent decades 
as a result of the widespread increase in school attendance rates. At the turn 
of the 21st century, school enrollment conditions remain diffi  cult. Schooling 
competes with other activities that potentially bring in income for households. 
On average, 45 percent of children 10–14 participate in domestic activities 
and 12 percent engage in an economic activity. Th ese activities do not always 
prevent them from attending school: nearly 31 percent of children 10–14 
both work and attend school. Th e competition seems to be mainly between 
 economic activity and school, not between domestic activity and school 
 (chapter 12). Children frequently combine domestic activities, sometimes for 
long hours, with school, whereas economic activity and school attendance tend 
to be mutually exclusive. 
Th is general fi nding calls for some qualifi cation. Girls and boys diff er. When 
girls are not in school, their labor is more oft en used to bring in income for the 
family or to attend to domestic tasks. Boys are more oft en employed as appren-
tices. Although apprenticeships are generally unpaid, they create human capital. 
Not surprisingly, diff erences in time use are evident across cities and social 
backgrounds. Sons and daughters of educated parents have a higher probability 
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of attending school, as do children from wealthier households. Th ese diff erences 
probably refl ect the role of the budget constraint in the trade-off  between work 
and education.
What benefi ts can Fatou and Moussa hope to gain from their qualifi cations? 
In most countries, education reduces the risk of unemployment, increases 
access to good jobs, and raises pay. In West Africa, unemployment increases 
with education, as shown in chapter 1: 15–18 percent of people with secondary 
or higher education are unemployed as opposed to just 11 percent of people 
with primary education and 8 percent of people with no education. Th e unem-
ployment observed in these countries is therefore oft en viewed as a voluntary 
“queuing” phenomenon, in which the unemployed can aff ord to be unemployed 
until they fi nd a job in line with their aspirations. In these circumstances, many 
discouraged job-seekers could be expected to either withdraw from the labor 
market or accept jobs that are not appropriate given their capabilities. 
Chapter 2 examines the extent and impact of this job mismatch. It shows 
that only 53 percent of workers 25 and over hold jobs that match their skills, 
with 30 percent underqualifi ed and 16 percent overqualifi ed for their job. Not 
surprisingly, the incidence of underqualifi cation is higher among workers with 
low levels of education and overqualifi cation is more common among workers 
with secondary or higher education. Fift y-nine percent of people with com-
pleted lower- secondary school but not upper-secondary school and 69 percent 
of people with completed secondary education but not completed higher educa-
tion are overqualifi ed. Higher-education graduates are slightly better off , with 
“just” 45 percent overqualifi ed for the work they do. Job-seekers’ expectations 
of fi nding a job that matches their education dwindle with the length of unem-
ployment, bearing out the hypothesis of “queuing” unemployment.
Given these realities, are Fatou and Moussa wrong to have spent time in 
school? Although their chances of fi nding a job that matches their qualifi cations 
probably fell as a result, they can expect to earn more: each additional year of 
education implies 10 percent higher pay. And even for overqualifi ed workers, 
each year of education beyond the minimum required education level to hold 
their job generates an additional increase in pay of 5–6 percent. 
Th ese fi ndings are confi rmed in chapter 5, which examines the distribution of 
workers in diff erent employment sectors (public, formal private, and informal) 
and evaluates the returns to education in each sector. It shows that although 
education is no safeguard against unemployment, it does open doors to the 
highest-paid sectors (public sector and formal private sector) and yields posi-
tive returns, including in the informal sector. Th e returns are convex, contrary 
to “standard” human capital theory, which posits that they are concave. Th is 
fi nding has important implications for education policy. If returns are convex, 
the massive investment in primary education may not produce the expected 
eff ects if access to secondary education is not also facilitated. Poor households 
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may choose to educate only some of their children to make the most of this 
convexity—with girls oft en suff ering as a result.
Th e fi nding of positive returns to education in the informal sector is impor-
tant, because this sector employs more than 70 percent of the employed labor 
force in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e large size of the informal sector is oft en per-
ceived as refl ecting segmentation in the employment market. Th e market is 
segmented when jobs are rationed by restrictive wage rules (minimum wage, 
wage-setting based on an effi  ciency wage principle, and so forth) or other rea-
sons. Because access to this sector is restricted, people who cannot enter it are 
thrown into a market segment where workers are less protected and less well 
paid. In developing countries, this issue is usually studied by distinguishing 
between the formal employment sector (public sector and formal private sec-
tor) and the informal sector. Th is distinction suggests that the informal sector is 
homogeneous. In fact, it covers a multitude of types of workers, including busi-
ness heads with employees, employees of these businesses, and own-account 
workers. Given that people working in the informal sector are able to evade 
taxation and social security contributions, some people in the sector may have 
chosen to work in it. Th is may be the case, in particular, with business heads. In 
a situation where many workers have only limited access to the capital market, 
not everyone can become a business head. Th is means that the informal sector 
itself could be segmented. 
Chapter 6 looks into this issue. It studies the allocation of labor among 
three sectors: the formal sector (public and private formal), the upper informal 
sector (entrepreneurs employing at least one person), and the lower informal 
sector (own-account workers and employees). It fi nds labor market segmenta-
tion between the upper and lower segments of the informal sector in the seven 
WAEMU cities studied: the proportion of people who, in view of their educa-
tion and experience, should be working in the formal or upper informal sector 
appears to be lower than it would be if the market were not segmented. Restric-
tion of access to the upper segment of the informal sector therefore emerges as 
an explanatory factor for poverty.
Th e emphasis on remuneration in studying populations exposed to the risk 
of poverty should not cloud the fact that other aspects of the labor relation-
ship are just as important. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on aspects of employment 
still rarely addressed in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Chapter 3 analyzes individual job satisfaction, measured in terms of the absence 
of desire to change job or status on the labor market. Th e fi ndings confi rm that 
a high wage increases job satisfaction but that it is not its only determinant. For 
example, other things equal, satisfaction increases with age (a refl ection of youth 
employment problems) and decreases with the level of education. Th is inverse 
relationship with education is consistent with the observation that the risk of 
being overeducated for one’s job increases with one’s skills level. In general, 
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working conditions appear to be just as important as earnings in determining 
satisfaction. For example, satisfaction is increased by working in the public sec-
tor; earning a fi xed wage; having a steady rather than a casual job; and being a 
senior executive, employer/proprietor, or even own-account worker. Working 
in the informal sector does not systematically reduce job satisfaction, a result 
at odds with conventional wisdom. Chapter 3 also underscores the role of indi-
vidual aspirations in job satisfaction: other things equal, people whose fathers 
have more than primary education have lower satisfaction than people with less 
educated fathers. 
Chapter 4 examines some of these employment aspects, addressing the ques-
tion of vulnerability in employment. Th is is virgin territory for the literature, at 
least in Sub-Saharan Africa. Th e authors build a composite indicator of vulner-
ability that covers many aspects of the job held: contractual insecurity, working 
conditions, unstable remuneration, underemployment, and a mismatch between 
job and individual characteristics. Th ey show that 85 percent of private sector 
workers in all of the cities considered are vulnerable on the basis of at least one 
of seven criteria. In a competitive labor market, the theory of compensating wage 
diff erentials predicts that everything else equal, people in jobs with undesirable 
characteristics, in terms of strenuous or hazardous work or the protection off ered 
to workers, should be better paid. Chapter 4 shows that although on average, 
employment vulnerability is associated with lower pay in the formal private sec-
tor, everything else equal, average earnings in the informal sector are higher for 
high-vulnerability jobs. Th e assumption that average gains can compensate for a 
certain level of vulnerability therefore holds in the informal sector.
Fatou may well have the same level of qualifi cations as Moussa, but does 
she have the same chances as Moussa of securing the job she wants? Do Fatou 
and Moussa have the same chances as people of diff erent origins with the same 
level of qualifi cations? Chapters 8 and 9 address these questions, each from a 
diff erent angle. Chapter 8 uses the information on jobs held by respondents and 
their fathers to analyze inequality of opportunities on the labor market. Th e 
fi ndings show that social origin plays a decisive role in labor market position, 
fostering the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Transmission chan-
nels are both direct and indirect. In some cities, access to the upper segments 
of the labor market (the public and formal private sectors) is determined by 
the level of education, itself dependent on the parents’ occupational status. In 
other cities, employment in one sector rather than another depends directly on 
the parents’ socioeconomic status. Ethnic group and migrant status also have 
signifi cant impacts in some cities. 
Chapter 9 addresses discrimination. It decomposes the earnings gap between 
men and women and between the largest and other ethnic groups. Th e results 
show a large earnings gap between men and women, with women earning 
21–50 percent of men’s earnings. Diff erences in the average characteristics of 
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male and female workers cannot explain these gaps. Th e gaps between ethnic 
groups are much smaller, and the largest group does not appear to systemati-
cally enjoy a more favorable position than other groups. 
Despite their qualifi cations, Moussa and Fatou have reason to feel appre-
hensive about their entry into the world of work. Th e labor market does not 
give everyone the same opportunities. Access to the most desirable employment 
sectors appears to be restricted and to depend as much on parents’ social status 
as on the qualifi cations individuals hold. Unemployment is high among people 
with good qualifi cations, and a sizable proportion of people who are employed 
are frustrated because they have not found jobs that match their skills, even 
though they have above-average earnings. Th e outlook for Fatou is even bleaker, 
because she is likely to suff er discrimination as a woman.
Fatou might marry quickly and ultimately choose to run the household. She 
would then specialize in performing domestic tasks and educating the children. 
Even if she works outside the home, however, she is very likely to shoulder 
most of the domestic work, as chapter 7 shows. In the 10 countries considered, 
domestic work represents nearly one-third of the total time worked on average. 
Despite a lower labor force participation rate, on average, women account for 
56 percent of the total time worked in the household, including domestic activi-
ties (62 percent in the WAEMU countries). Women in Africa do most of the 
domestic work whether or not they work a paid job. Th ey account for 43 percent 
of market working hours but 89 percent of domestic working hours. Working 
women work a “double day,” in that their domestic workload is not lighter than 
it is for nonworking women. 
A number of factors are correlated with inequalities in the gender division 
of labor. Social norms, measured by various variables, appear to play a decisive 
role: relative position in the household, age bracket, religion, and, to a lesser 
extent, education all have a signifi cant impact on the gender distribution of 
domestic and market work. Th e type of household and its demographic struc-
ture also play an important part in this distribution: large, polygamous house-
holds and households with a larger number of adults have a diff erent gender 
division of labor than households made up of monogamous couples with young 
children.
Faced with problems fi nding work, many young people consider migrat-
ing. Th is book addresses the migration question from two novel points of view. 
Chapter 10 deals with migration within the WAEMU economic area. Th e simul-
taneous series of labor force surveys conducted in the same format in the seven 
French-speaking capitals provides an opportunity to examine the monetary 
determinants of migration within this zone, in which member countries have 
signed a free movement agreement. 
Th e chapter paints a picture of migration between Southern countries, a sub-
ject still somewhat neglected by the literature; it does not address South-North 
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migration, which requires data of a diff erent type. Th e chapter documents the 
magnitude of migration between WAEMU countries. Not surprisingly, Côte 
d’Ivoire is by far the leading country for immigration in the region. Mali and 
Burkina Faso supply the largest contingent of emigrants. Togo and Benin post 
high immigration and emigration fi gures. 
Given that Fatou and Moussa graduated from upper-secondary school, they 
are unlikely to migrate within WAEMU, as the fi ndings show that migrants who 
move from one African capital to another are less educated on average than 
nonmigrants, both in their country of origin and in their destination country.7 
In most countries, they have a higher probability of working in the informal 
sector and earning lower wages. Th erefore, the brain drain phenomenon does 
not appear to be the main characteristic of migratory fl ows between French-
speaking West African countries. However, other things equal, migrants’ choices 
as to where they live do appear, at least in part, to respond to diff erences in 
remuneration: like nonmigrants, migrants choose to live in cities where, given 
their characteristics, their earnings expectations are highest.
With their qualifi cations, Fatou and Moussa are more likely to migrate to 
a developed country than another developing country. Moreover, if they do 
migrate, they are likely to do so only temporarily: recent analyses of interna-
tional migration show that a large proportion of migrants ultimately return 
to their country of origin. Th e net impact of international migration, skilled 
or otherwise, on migrants’ country of origin is thus still a research question. 
Migration of educated workers might not be as negative as feared if migrants 
return in suffi  cient numbers, bringing with them capital and know-how they 
manage to use productively in their country of origin. 
Th is subject is analyzed in chapter 11, which uses data from the 1-2-3 sur-
veys conducted in the WAEMU countries to evaluate wage diff erential between 
nonmigrant workers and migrant workers who have returned to their coun-
try of origin (“return migrants”). Th e chapter’s fi ndings distinguish between 
migrants based on whether they have returned from a developed country or 
from another WAEMU capital. Migrants returning from WAEMU member 
countries and nonmigrants display very similar labor market participation 
behavior and characteristics. In contrast, migrants returning from OECD 
countries are much more educated, more likely to be employed, and wealthier 
than nonmigrants. Th ey also have a greater probability of working in the formal 
sector. However, this diff erence vanishes (or turns negative) when migrants’ 
characteristics are taken into account, suggesting that they suff er a loss of social 
capital that reduces their access to formal sector jobs. In terms of income, the 
results reveal the existence of a large migration premium for migrants returning 
from OECD countries. Informal sector businesses run by migrants returning 
from OECD countries are also more productive than businesses run by nonmi-
grants or migrants returning from WAEMU or other countries. 
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One problem is the same for everyone: migrants and nonmigrants, formal 
sector employees, informal sector entrepreneurs and employees, and even the 
economically inactive all need to ensure that they have enough disposable 
income at retirement age to maintain a minimum level of well-being. Th is 
question probably has not yet occurred to Fatou and Moussa. Yet they can see 
around them that many people at retirement age have to keep working because 
they do not receive enough replacement income. If they foresee fi nding them-
selves in this situation when they are old, they might be encouraged to adopt 
certain precautionary behavior to cope with the situation as best they can when 
the time comes. For example, they may decide to have more children than 
they would have had if a public pension scheme had been available, in order to 
ensure that their children can look aft er them in their old age. Having people 
remain in the labor market into old age probably reduces the chances of young 
people fi nding work. Th e question of working at retirement age, addressed in 
chapter 13, is therefore an important one.
Pensions are available only to the minority of Africans who worked in private 
fi rms in the formal sector or the public sector. Moreover, most pensions are 
paltry, especially in the private sector. Pensions are not a source of wage replace-
ment but more like a minimum subsistence income. Despite the lack of pen-
sions, few seniors in Africa are dependent on their children. In fact, most still 
have young children to support, forcing them to struggle to make their meager 
incomes meet family outlays that burden them through a late age. Th ese elderly 
heads of household also oft en have to support older children who have not yet 
entered the labor market. Consequently, a relatively large number of men still 
work aft er retirement age. More than 60 percent of people 55–59 and 47 percent 
of people 60–64 still work. As they age, workers are increasingly confi ned to the 
informal sector. Th e debate on raising the retirement age is therefore high on 
the agenda in the South, as it is in the North. However, it is not put in the same 
terms. Whereas workers in the North are calling to keep the retirement age as 
low as possible, one of the major demands of unions in this Southern subregion 
is to raise the retirement age. 
Many diff erences can be observed across the cities studied, some of which 
warrant particular attention. Chapters 2 (job mismatch), 8 (inequality of oppor-
tunities), and 9 (discrimination) identify two groups of more or less homoge-
neous countries. Labor markets in the capitals of the coastal countries (Benin, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Togo) appear to have greater intergenerational social 
mobility, less segmentation, and less discrimination against women and ethnic 
groups than the capitals of the landlocked countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Niger). Among the seven WAEMU countries studied, the landlocked countries 
also have the lowest human development, wealth, and urbanization levels. With-
out seeking causality, one cannot help but be struck by the link observed between 
the extent of development and the functioning of the labor market. It may be 
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no coincidence that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are, in that order, the three 
countries that produce the largest contingents of migrants in the subregion (see 
chapter 10). Th e landlocked countries are not behind the coastal countries in all 
aspects: Mali and Benin post the highest levels of satisfaction (with 50 percent 
satisfi ed workers), for example, way ahead of Côte d’Ivoire (37 percent).
Making Data Collection Work for Research
All of this book’s contributors are researchers at Développement, Institutions et 
Mondialisation (DIAL), a joint research unit of the Institut de Recherche pour le 
Développement (IRD) and the University of Paris Dauphine. (Brief biographies 
of the contributors appear at the beginning of the book).
Th is work is based on an original approach taken by DIAL since its establish-
ment (in 1990), which consists of combining statistical production, economic 
research, and public policy analysis (Cling and Roubaud 2006; Nordman and 
Roubaud 2010). Th e involvement of a research center in the production of offi  -
cial statistical data is unusual: economists have long worked “far from the fi eld,” 
using databases produced by others, especially public statistics. (Th e World 
Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Study program represents a notable 
exception.) It is only recently, at the instigation of promoters of ex post pub-
lic policy impact evaluation methods (such as the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab), that academic development economists have started collecting 
data, albeit generally in the form of ad hoc protocols rather than offi  cial sur-
veys. Academic involvement in data collection kills two birds with one stone. 
It helps fi ll the hole in statistics in developing countries, particularly in Africa, 
thereby broadening the scope of applied economics research while ensuring 
that the analyses produced are compatible with offi  cial fi gures. It also helps 
build bridges between the statistical and academic communities, which are 
nowhere as disconnected as in Africa. We hope that readers will see the merits 
of this approach, which warrants becoming widespread practice.
Target Audience
Th is book targets the whole development community interested in labor mar-
kets and, more broadly, Sub-Saharan African development, including research-
ers and students, policy makers, donors, and informed ordinary citizens, from 
the South or the North. Pursuing such a large and heterogeneous audience inev-
itably creates a trade-off . Th e book adopts the best econometric practices (for 
the research-oriented reader) but is accessible to all readers in order to provide 
food for thought and stimulate democratic debate. Readers interested in more 
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details can consult the full version of the book posted on the book’s website 
(http://www.dial.ird.fr/publications). 
Our approach is mainly quantitative, not because we consider it supe-
rior to any other approach but because it corresponds to our skills. Th ere-
fore, readers who are more prone to qualitative and narrative approaches are 
invited to put their own in-depth knowledge in the broad picture perspective, 
in which they are embedded in, and eventually confront, these two comple-
mentary lenses. 
Th is book does not provide press-a-button policy recommendations; pro-
viding such recommendations is neither our aim nor our area of expertise. 
Instead, it provides the evidence base on which sound policies should be 
grounded. 
Notes
 1. Many characteristics in English-speaking countries are probably quite diff erent, 
given the lasting imprint of institutions and economic and social structures inher-
ited from colonization (Cogneau 2007; Austin 2010). Sub-Saharan Africa is a mainly 
rural continent. Focusing only on urban areas, as this book does, ignores a funda-
mental component of African specifi city.
 2. Th e studies by Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur (2006); Perry and others (2007); 
Ostrom, Kanbur, and Guha-Khasnobis (2007); Jütting and de Laiglesia (2009); and 
Bacchetta, Ernst, and Bustamante (2009), for example, contain as many defi nitions 
of informal employment as they do chapters.
 3. Th is study, based on the Network for Labor Market Analysis in Africa (RAMTA) 
network data, draws on a series of pilot employment surveys of households in seven 
African cities (Abidjan, Antananarivo, Bamako, Conakry, Dakar, Ouagadougou, and 
Yaoundé) between 1986–87 and 1992. RAMTA collected these data at the initiative 
of the International Labour Organization’s International Institute for Labor Studies. 
Th is process closely resembles the Programme d’Appui Régional à la Statistique (PAR-
STAT) project system, launched by the WAEMU Commission and funded by the 
European Commission, from which this book takes its data. Th e same labor force 
survey was conducted in several West African cities in a short space of time to allow 
for comparability.
 4. South Africa, with one of the highest unemployment rates in the world and a rela-
tively small informal sector in urban areas, is atypical of the rest of the continent.
 5. In most of the countries in which the two phases have been conducted, the Phase 1 
and Phase 2 estimates of informal sector size are not signifi cantly diff erent.
 6. Time-related underemployment is defi ned as working less than a certain norm (here 
35 hours a week) when the individual would prefer to work more. Invisible under-
employment refers to workers who earn less than a certain amount (here the mini-
mum wage) (see chapters 1 and 2).
 7. Not all of the cities examined are administrative capitals. Abidjan and Cotonou are 
referred to as capitals throughout this book because they are the most important 
economic centers in their countries (Cotonou is also the seat of government).
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